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Government, Scandals 
and Political Support in Italy
Introduction
When citizens say they support the political system, 
what do they effectively support? The key to answer-
ing this question may be found in Easton’s work (1965; 
1975). He describes the basic elements of democratic 
support: citizens’ evaluation of institutions (perfor-
mance) and their components (parties and political 
actors), and the citizens’ identification with the State. 
Easton allows classification of political and institutional 
systems by emphasizing differences and similarities be-
tween three specific political objects (political commu-
nity, regime and authority) and different levels of politi-
cal support. He also distinguishes between two types 
of citizen orientations: diffuse support and specific sup-
port. Diffuse support is a deep-seated set of attitudes 
towards politics and the operation of the political sys-
tem, and is relatively resistant to change. Specific sup-
port refers to satisfaction with institutional outcomes. It 
is directed towards political or state elites’ actions. Spe-
cific support may be analogous to the “responsiveness” 
delineated by Pharr and Putnam (2000) as “democratic 
dissatisfactions”. Diffuse and specific types of support 
are not disconnected, especially when analysed from 
a longitudinal perspective (Adamany and Grossman 
1983). Furthermore, diffuse support may also absorb 
the effects of unpopular decisions (Gibson 1989; Tyler 
1990). In this respect, diffuse support can be high even 
when specific support is low. 
Studies on political support have shown that the sce-
nario of the last twenty years is not very optimistic. 
Many scholars, using different measures of specific and 
diffuse support, have found that in most of the consoli-
dated democracies citizens are very dissatisfied with 
their political institutions and political class (McAllister 
2000; Norris 1999). This situation reveals a state of clear 
democratic malaise (Dalton 2004). 
This article analyses government support in Italy, as a 
measure of regime support. Italy represents an interest-
ing case for two reasons. First, in the last three legisla-
tures, political leaders have been involved in different 
scandals: misconduct, financial corruption, and abuse 
of public office (Newell 2010). Moreover, the number of 
political scandals has slowly increased in recent years, 
especially in 2010, when Berlusconi’s lifestyle heavily 
coloured the image of Italy internationally (Economist 
2010). Second, the political support of Italian citizens is 
declining. In the last five years trust in political institu-
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tions, especially in the Parliament and the Government, 
has decreased (Memoli 2011). Besides, government 
popularity is declining (Corrispondenti 2010).
Political scandals represent one of the factors that may 
influence citizens’ public values and their approval of 
the Government, and hence also damage the public 
figures involved (Newell 2010). Yet, even if scandals pro-
duce negative public reactions (Peters and Welch 1978) 
and are unfavourable for a democracy (Maier 2011), it is 
also true that the effect of these consequences can be 
limited.  The Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi won the 
elections of 2001 and 2008 despite being under inves-
tigation in several corruption cases and inquiries (Van-
nucci 2009: 235).
Thus, if a scandal is defined as something that ‘refers to 
action or events involving certain kinds of transgression 
which become known to others and are sufficiently se-
rious to elicit a public response’ (Thompson, 2000: 13), 
what happens to government popularity when a scan-
dal occurs? Different views within the literature have ex-
plored the effect of scandals on government popular-
ity. Scandals can lower regard for individual politicians 
and government leaders (Martorano and Ulbig 2008; 
Bowler and Karp 2004; Clarke et al. 1998), erode pub-
lic trust in government (Damico, Conway and Bowman 
Damico, 2000), and reduce public’s support for institu-
tions (Morris and Clawson 2007). Occasionally scandals 
also have electoral consequences (Cowley 2002; McAl-
lister 2000; Hetherington 1999). 
Nevertheless, not all scholars agree on the idea that 
political scandals will damage the political system (Eas-
ton, 1965; Citrin, 1974) underlining as scandals are not 
always dysfunctional (Sabato et al. 2000; Kepplinger 
and Ehmig 2004; Kepplinger 2005). This is confirmed 
by the Watergate scandal since public support for the 
political system increased (Dunham and  Mauss 1976; 
Sniderman et al. 1976). Others (Dimock and Jacobson 
1995; Alford et al. 1994: 790), claim that “scandals lead 
to a decrease in a member’s electoral margin. However, 
they do not routinely result in an incumbent’s defeat”. 
In his analysis of the impact of media coverage of politi-
cal scandals on political disaffection in Germany,  Maier 
(2002) shows a positive effect of media coverage on 
satisfaction with democracy.
People respond negatively to financial scandals affect-
ing evaluations of a politician (Doherty et al. 2011). Fur-
thermore, considering Inglehart (1997), it is possible to 
claim that the public in traditional countries should re-
act to private misconduct more negatively than people 
in secular-rational countries. Thus, sex scandals should 
cause more public uproar in traditional countries, such 
as the USA, than in those that are classified as very “sec-
ular-rational” (such as Italy). In this work, taking as the 
starting point the idea that Italy, despite being a secu-
lar-rational country, is strongly conditioned by Catholi-
cism, sex scandals are expected to produce the same 
negative public reaction as financial scandals.
To estimate the effect that financial and sex scandals 
have on government popularity a longitudinal data-
set—2005 to 2010—based on survey data is used. Ap-
plying a Prais-Winston regression model, this article ar-
gues that government popularity tends to decrease if 
the behaviour of the political class diverges from public 
morality.
Political support
The conceptualization of political support is developed 
by adopting Easton’s (1965) theoretical perspective. 
Easton (1975: 436) defines support as “the way in which 
a person evaluative orients himself to some objects 
through either his attitudes or his behavior”. He defines 
support for a political system as a multidimensional 
concept that has two different modes---specific and 
diffuse—which are directed to three objects of a politi-
cal system: the community, the regime, and the author-
ities. Accordingly, political support is to be understood 
as the extent to which individuals evaluate political 
objects positively. Political objects can be represented 
as the combination of attitudes about political leaders, 
institutions, and the system as a whole (Easton 1975: 
436). Most of these distinctions are based on the idea 
that ”democratic political systems need to keep the 
support of their citizens to remain viable . . . short-term 
failures in the capacity to satisfy public demands do not 
necessarily erode the diffuse support to the regime or 
to the political community’ (Dalton, 1999: 59).
In the last twenty years political support in consoli-
dated democracies has not been stable and political 
disaffection has characterized the prevailing political 
attitudes among citizens (Pharr and Putnam 2000). In 
many established western democracies, citizens have 
become more critical towards their political leaders, 
governmental institutions, and democratic systems 
(Dalton 2004). The decline mainly involves support to-
wards the authorities and regimes (Norris 1999; Pharr 
and Putnam 2000; Dalton 2004). If citizens are more 
likely to approve their governments when they per-
form well in policy terms (Mishler and Rose 2001; Ev-
ans and Whitefield 1995) or when politicians are held 
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accountable (Weatherford 1992), it is also true that the 
relationship between institutional performance and 
political support has been inverse or weak (Anderson 
and Guillory 1997; Cusack 1999; Bellucci, Memoli and 
Sanders 2011).
The Italian context does not provide very optimistic 
prospects. Italians are characterized by very low lev-
els of satisfaction towards democracy, as well as by 
political skepticism (Almond and Verba 1963). Lack of 
political interest and low levels of information have 
negatively conditioned the relationship between citi-
zens and state. Yet, they have also contributed to limit 
political efficacy and increased political alienation of 
citizens. In other words, Italians display a political cul-
ture characterized by low levels of civicness. This result 
was successively confirmed by Banfield’s study (1976) 
realized in Basilicata1 . He showed that communitar-
ian ethos----the relationship between families and be-
tween those and the others---was damaged by citizens’ 
orientation to maximizing the material advantages of 
their own families. Thus, citizens were characterized by 
weak social networks and low propensity to engage in 
cooperative forms of behaviour. 
Even if Almond and Verba were criticized for their con-
clusions, which contrast with other interpretations pro-
posed by Italian scholars (Sani 1980; 1989), the situation 
has not changed several decades later. Putnam (1993), 
in his analysis of civic traditions of the Italian regions, 
shows that different levels of civicness are related to 
political institutions’ performances, with a direct impact 
on common well-being and local community govern-
ability (Cartocci 2000). That could produce a vicious 
circle whereby low political performances further in-
crease citizens’ institutional disaffection. This represents 
a trend that, since 1990, appears confirmed by citizens’ 
anti-party (Bardi 1996; Sani and Segatti 2001) and anti-
political (Mastropaolo 2000) behaviour. In this respect, 
citizens are alienated from politics and characterized by 
low levels of political efficacy (Bardi and Pasquino 1995).
However, this picture appears excessively pessimistic. 
As Cartocci (2007) shows that unevenly distributed 
civicness characterizes only some parts of the coun-
try. At the end of the last century, even if the distance 
between citizens and the political class was clear, the 
level of institutional trust increased. In fact, Italy appears 
very close to other European nations in terms of social 
capital (Sciolla 2004), however, the institutional malaise 
1 The city name adopted by Banfield is imaginary. The city 
which Banfielf refers is Chiaromonte, a little Basilicata county , 
situated in Potenza province.
seems to persist (Graph 1). If, following Tangentopoli2 
(1992-2000), citizens expressed more trust towards the 
key political institutions, since 2001 the trend would be 
reversed. With systematic fluctuation (in the 2001 Ber-
lusconi II government; in the 2005 Berlusconi III govern-
ment; in the 2006 Prodi II government and in the 2008 
with Berlusconi IV Government) political institutions 
have lost appeal among citizens. Exceptions have been 
the judicial system and the civil service, which have 
registered positive trends. In contrast, Parliament and 
Government have lost the trust of more than 10% of 
citizens. An explanation of this trend may lie in the neg-
ative performances of these two institutions during this 
time-period. Even if the data cover a limited period, it is 
possible to claim that since 1990, Italians have viewed 
their political institutions in pessimistic terms.
When political outcomes are not in line with citizens’ 
expectations, the citizens will punish the institutions 
and the political class, following a punishment-reward 
logic. Thus, the weakening of public support would 
make it harder for the government to address the coun-
try’s problems properly. The levels of government pop-
ularity3  in 2005-2010 show that government choices 
have affected citizens’ evaluations of its performance. In 
fact, at the end of the 2008 electoral term, citizens have 
confirmed their dissatisfaction towards the incumbent 
government and they did not hesitate to sanction it 
(Graph 1).
During the last five years, government popularity has 
declined from 38.5% to 30.0% (graph 2). As in the case 
of the previous institutional indicators, also this one is 
characterized by high variability since it is influenced 
by government choices and by internal and external 
events. The trend of government popularity clearly 
shows the negative public judgment during the initial 
months of 2005, probably due to the crisis that affected 
Casa delle Libertà4  following the regional elections. 
This induced Berlusconi to replace some of the min-
isters. The effects of the new governmental appoint-
ments are evident only in the subsequent quarter (Sep-
2 Tangentopoli is a term which was coined to describe 
pervasive corruption in the Italian political system. It began on 
February 17, 1992, when a member of the Italian Socialist party, 
Mario Chiesi, was arrested for accepting a bribe from a Milan 
cleaning firm.
3 The question is: How do you evaluate government work? 
The categories are three: positively, negatively and don’t know. 
The data were collected by ISPO and the percentage values were 
computed considering also the don’t know answers.
4 The Casa della Libertà was a major Italian centre-right 
political and electoral alliance led by Silvio Berlusconi. It was 
composed of several parties.
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Graph 1. Confidence in political institutions
Source: Eurobarometer, Itanes, Eurispess.
Graph 2. Government popularity
Source: Ispo (2005-2010)
tember 2005). However, even if government support 
increased, in the 2006 elections Berlusconi experienced 
an electoral. Until September 2006 the new Prodi gov-
ernment benefited from relatively high levels of citizen 
support (4 out of 10 evaluated the work of the govern-
ment positively). However it was a short-term success. 
Judicial problems affected some of the government’s 
members and a number of unpopular decisions under-
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mined government popularity. At the end of 2007 
the support for the government declined to 29.0%. 
The general citizen’s discontent is evident looking at 
the results of the 2008 election: the citizens, again 
punishing the incumbent, delegate the right-wing 
coalition to guide the country, with a positive judg-
ment higher than 55.0%. Even in this case, the idyllic 
moment was very short for the Prodi II Government. 
A series of political scandals, in which both govern-
ment members and Prime Minister Berlusconi were 
involved, influenced public opinion and the govern-
ment popularity, which in December 2010 declined 
to 30.0%. In this period, economic and sex scandals 
have affected some members of the government.
There are several factors to consider when defining 
an event as a scandal: the relevance of the alleged 
offence with respect to conceived societal norms 
(King, 1986; Schudson, 2004); the presence of calls 
for resignation made by politicians in parliamentary 
discussions (Dewan and Dowding 2005), and media 
attention given to the scandal, measured either as 
the number of days during which it gained coverage 
in the media or as the number of articles focusing on 
it in the press (Bytzek 2007). The most successful ap-
proach would include a combination of all these fac-
tors (Esser 1999). Moving from this point and consid-
ering the scandals between 2005 and 2010, in which 
government members have been involved, seven 
specific events have been selected. Some of them 
have involved bank managers and politicians (Ban-
copoli 2005), others government members—Minis-
ter Scajola5,  the head of the civil protection agency 
Guido Bertolaso6 ----or the Prime Minister—Lodo 
Milano7  and Mills8 . Apart from economic scandals, 
also sex scandals have coloured Italian politics: Ruby9, 
5 In april 2010, Italian Industry Minister Claudio Scajola, 
one of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s closest allies, has resigned 
amid allegations of an improper real-estate deal – he may have 
used money from a kickback to purchase a luxury apartment.
6 The ministry’s head, Guido Bertolaso, was credited with the 
“miracle” of getting the garbage off the streets of Naples, responding 
to last summer’s earthquake in the Abruzzo, and managing various 
other public works projects. At the moment he is an ugly tangle of 
cronyism, waste, and corruption, as well as prostitution.
7 It refers to a trial opposing Silvio Berlusconi to Carlo De 
Benedetti for the Mondadori publisher proprietary rights.
8 David Mills, the British lawyer who was the witness, had 
already been convicted of accepting a 600,000 euro bribe paied by 
Berlusconi to influence a judiciary sentence.
9 The girl at the centre of the affair—a 17-year-old Moroccan 
runaway—calls herself Ruby Rubacuori, or “Ruby Heartstealer”. The 
precise nature of their involvement is unclear. “Ruby”—whose real 
name appears to be Karima El Mahroug—said in an interview that 
Noemi10  and D’Addario 11. Thus, if government popu-
larity declined between 2005 and 2010, to what extent 
the above mentioned scandals have conditioned this 
negative trend?
The Hypothesis
Markovits and Silverstein (1988: 9) define a political 
scandal as “a betrayal of the public trust in terms of the 
accountability and process of the liberal democratic 
state”. Accordingly, scandals were encapsulating ”the 
dynamics of accountability in democracies” (Tumber 
and Waisboard 2004:1035) and have become an impor-
tant dimension of electoral politics. Scandals seem also 
to damage an important political resource, namely in-
dividual political reputation (Thompson 2000).
Even if the scandals’ impact could be mediated by indi-
vidual political attitudes and home-team effect (Mishler 
and Rose 2001), their effect on political institutions is 
evident (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; della Porta 
2000; Seligson 2002; Anderson and Tverdova 2003). Of 
course, not all political scandals produce the same ef-
fects in the same way. For example, the 1994 financial 
abuse scandals in the USA had quite different repercus-
sions. Even if Clinton was alleged of taking illegal loans 
from the Whiterwater development project in Arkan-
sas, he remained in power and was subsequently re-
elected. A different trend occurs when sex scandals are 
considered. It the case of New Jersey Governor James 
E. McGreevey, his confession of being involved in an ex-
tra-marital relation contributed to the end of his politi-
cal career. Even if political scandals seem to involve in-
dividual politicians affecting their career, they may have 
consequences for the government (Miller 1999), parties 
and politicians (Doherty et al. 2011) as well. Hence, the 
discussion leads to the expectation that the following 
influence on government popularity should be found:
she visited Mr Berlusconi’s home outside Milan only once, and 
that after giving him an account of her misfortunes, he gave her 
money and some jewellery. But, according to leaked details from 
an inquiry in Milan, she had earlier told police and prosecutors that 
she had been there three
times, and that one of the parties ended in an erotic game called 
“Bunga, Bunga”.
10 Letizia Noemi, a model/dancer, is the Italian Prime Minister 
Silvio Berlusconi’s mistress and the reason behind his divorce. The 
PM’s wife Veronica Lario has asked for divorce after finding out he 
was having a relationship with a minor.
11 Patrizia D’Addario is a former model and girl escort. She 
was paid to attend Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi’ s private 
parties. She has pictures showing her with Berlusconi in his 
bedroom.
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Hypothesis: Both sex and economic scandals should mat-
ter for government popularity.
Using a regression model, in the next section I empiri-
cally test of this hypothesis.
Data, measurement and analysis
The goal of this article is to assemble a government 
popularity function12  that meets the following criteria: 
the measures of the dependent and independent vari-
ables have to be comparable; each time-series has to 
be long enough; time-series have to cover the same 
time period. These results were achieved by use four 
observations for each year between 2005 and 2010. The 
total N (24) offers an acceptable dataset to calculate the 
proposed government popularity function 13.
The general model used through the application a Prais-
Wisten regression 14, is presented by the following equa-
tion: 
Where
Pgov is the level of government popularity (Pgov)15; 
Bertolaso, Scajola, Mills, Lodo Milano and Bancopoli are 
dummy variables with value 1 if economic scandals occur;
Ruby, Noemi and D’Addario are dummy variables with 
value 1 if sex scandals occur;
tgov is a dummy variable with value 1 if a right-wing gov-
ernment is in power;
e is the error term.
I have also controlled for a variable expressing the percent-
age of those who in the next election intend to vote for a 
party, which is in the governmental coalition.
12 The question is: ‘How would you evaluate the work of the 
government until now? Very positive, positive enough, negative 
enough, completely negative.’ Approval is the percentage of those 
answering ‘positive’. Source: ISPO.
13 The variable is represented by individual data surveyed 
by ISPO between 2005 and 2010.  For each quarter we have 
computed the mean of percentage values of who evaluate the 
work of the government very positive or positive enough.
14 Serial correlation is a frequent problem in the analysis of 
time series data. A first regression model showed autocorrelation 
problems. To correct the regression for the serial correlation we 
have chosen to apply a Prais–Winsten estimation model. Even if 
one assumes no autocorrelation, bias can result when the sample 
is small (N=24), the conclusion must be accepted cautiously.
15 The concept was measured by the question: “How 
would you evaluate the work of the government until now? 
(positive, negative, not answer). The government popularity is the 
percentage of those answering ‘positive’. The source is ISPO.
Table 1 reports the results of the models. They largely fit 
my expectations. When scandals occur, the government 
has a higher probability of being negatively judged. The 
effect of economic scandals related to government mem-
bers on the dependent variable is higher than that related 
to sex scandals involving the Prime Minister Berlusconi. 
This is particularly evident when comparing the Bertolaso 
scandal (b=-29.380) with Mills scandal (b=-16.007) or the 
Scajola scandal with Lodo Milano. This evidence shows 
that although citizens express a rather negative judgment 
toward the government when economic scandals occur, 
this is less evident when the scandals involve Berlusconi. 
A possible explanation is that the citizens are used to (and 
in a sense they accept) the scandals of Berlusconi, given 
the fact that they started in 1994 but, so far, they have not 
produced any conviction sentence against him. On the 
contrary, sex scandals related to Berlusconi, reveal a nega-
tive impact on the government approval, with the only ex-
ception of the scandal related to Letizia Noemi.  Both Ruby 
(b=-28.332) and D’Addario 
(b=-17.838) scandals show 
a negative impact on the 
government popularity, with 
the former marked by higher intensity than the latter. This 
could be explained by the fact that the Prime Minister 
abused his power to pressure for a release of a young girl 
detained under accusation of theft. 
I have controlled the results using a dummy variable on citi-
zens’ intention of vote. As reported in the second model of 
Table 1, my results are stable and in some cases their inten-
sity even increases, showing that scandals have a similar 
impact on citizens of all political orientations. Finally, I have 
found that in Italy both economic and sex scandals have 
a negative impact on government popularity—Bertolaso, 
Mills and Ruby scandals show similar coefficients—, but 
the economic scandals of Berlusconi are less influential 
than those related to other government staff. So, even if 
Italy has been defined as a secular-rational nation, the citi-
zens are sensitive not only to economic scandals, but also 
to sex ones.
Conclusion
The present study examined the effects of scandals on 
the popularity of governments based on data from five 
consecutive years. Citizens are broadly mistrustful of poli-
tics, skeptical about institutions, disenchanted with the 
effectiveness of the democratic process (Dalton 2004). 
My data appears to confirm this tendency showing that, 
in the last years, confidence in political institutions in Italy 
ecoalitiongovernmentDaddarioNoemiRuby
BancopoliLodoMilanoMillsScaiolaBertolasoPgov
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Table 1. The scandals effects on the government popularity
Note: a) the variables are lagged (t-1); *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Source: Ispo (2005-2010).
    Coef. Std. Err.  Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
Economic-Corruption 
scandals             
Bertolaso(a)   
-29.380 
*** 7.792   
-
29.605*** 7.846 
Scajola   
-
27.782*** 7.723   
-
29.606*** 8.290 
Lodo Milano   -14.298* 7.793   -16.329* 8.297 
Mills (a)   -16.007** 6.005   -18.502** 6.877 
Bancopoli (a)   -11.621 7.100   -10.745 7.772 
       
Sexual scandal             
Ruby   
-
28.332*** 7.795   
-
28.104*** 7.868 
Noemi    -7.348 7.412   -9.710 8.329 
D’Addario   -17.838** 7.667   -19.580** 8.032 
       
Government             
Left-right   12.755** 4.240   12.170** 4.405 
       
Control             
Citizens’ future vote 
behaviour          0.393 0.581 
       
Constant   -0.263 3.221   -17.455 25.384 
       
Adj R-squared 0.483     0.495     
Anova F (sig.) 
3.28 
(0.026)     
3.16 
(0.032
)     
Durbin Watson statistic 1.953     1.946     
has declined. This is particu-
larly evident in the case of the 
government. Although many 
factors could determine this 
trend, I showed that scandals 
are certainly relevant. My re-
sults seem to confirm Bowler 
and Karp’s argument (2004) on 
the attitude of voters to punish 
scandalous behaviour more 
heavily than they reward good 
behaviour.
I demonstrated that the rela-
tionship between both eco-
nomic and sex scandals and 
government popularity is of 
similar intensity. Two main 
conclusions can therefore 
be derived from my analysis. 
First, even governments that 
are able to present policies in 
line with citizens’ expectations 
may lose political support if 
they are affected by scandals. 
In this respect, a widespread 
democratic malaise among 
citizens could also be the re-
sult of recurrent scandals. Sec-
ond, it has been argued in the 
literature that alternation in 
power can restrain corruption 
and rent-seeking (Sartori 1976) 
and strengthen the rule of law 
(Horowitz et al 2009). In other 
words, although in Italy alter-
nation in power has touched 
the highest peak in the past 
twenty years, the impact of 
political corruption and public 
immorality is still very high.
While my results clearly meet 
the expectation of a dysfunc-
tional theory—the political 
scandals have a negative im-
pact on government popularity—and demonstrate, 
unlike other longitudinal studies (see Maurer 2003), 
that the relationship between scandals and politi-
cal support is strong. A more robust investigation of 
any cumulative effect of scandals on political support 
would ideally examine data covering a longer time span. 
Although problems of data availability currently restrain 
such approach, collection of cross-national panel data 
would provide useful material for future research. The 
question of how different kinds of scandals may mutu-
ally interact is another question that deserves further 
investigation.
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